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NATURAL THEOLOGY, METHODOLOGICAL
NATURALISM, AND "TURTLES ALL
THE WAY DOWN"
Del Ratzsch

Natural theology has not been held in particularly high regard during the past
century and one half. However, recent developments both within science and
within philosophy of science offer some new possibilities and resources. In
what follows I explore some areas and structures within which natural theological potential might (in principle) emerge. I further argue that the current
weapon of choice against substantive science / religion intertwining - methodological naturalism - not only fails as an inviolable norm, thus leaving the possibility of a genuine natural theology intact, but that it may even have unhappy theological consequences.

I. Introduction

Although natural theology is frequently defined as involving what humans
can learn of God independent of special revelation, the widely held de facto
picture focuses primarily upon what (if any) theological truths empirical
(especially scientific) investigation of nature might secure for us. Prospects
for such science-based natural theology will depend upon the nature and
capabilities of science, and also upon the connections to theology which
science might be capable of supporting. In what follows, I will argue that
resources for natural theology are potentially richer than generally supposed, and that one major possible stumbling block to natural theology
(methodological naturalism) not only fails to withstand close scrutiny, but
could even have unfortunate theological consequences.

II. Scientific inference(s)
The phrase 'scientific inference' is often taken to suggest that there is
some single style of reasoning which is definitively and uniquely scientific.
Such is not, of course, the case. A number of types of reasoning are essential to various facets of science. Prediction, for instance, may involve
straightforward implication, but currents often run in the opposite direction in confirmation - from confirming data back up to confirmed theory.
There is here a backwash - an inferential ebb tide - with the empirical success of a theor:V anchoring its epistemic warrant. In some cases, even in the
absence of strict inference in any direction a substantive intermeshing - the
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smooth embedability of a theory into an accepted wider conceptual matrix
- is taken as constituting support for the embedded theory.! Other currents are both more complicated and even less directional. For instance,
the familiar claims that data are theory-laden, or that observation is partly
constituted by paradigms, have led some to see epistemic feedback loops
within science. 2 And depending upon where the boundaries for scientifically acceptable explanations are set, 'inference to best explanation' presents an extremely wide scope for scientific validation.
Epistemic legitimation can thus move in a variety of directions within
science. Given that cognitive procedures within science are basically
honed versions of common sense procedures, it is possible that processes
generating epistemic legitimation within science may do so beyond science
as well. For instance, just as empirical success provides backwash confirmation to relevant theory, the broader success of science itself might provide some level of genuine confirmation to the larger philosophical matrix
within which that science is embedded.

III. Scientific inference and natural theology: broad possibilities
It is widely acknowledged that the birth and early development of science owe a considerable conceptual and practical debt to the Western
European Christian intellectual context. Science works only in a very particular sort of reality and only with a very particular sort of conception of
reality. The requisite picture - of a comprehend able, intelligible, uniform,
predictable, even beautiful, cosmos which can in principle make sense to
finite minds like ours when observed via perceptual faculties like ours - is a
picture of a cosmos structured in fundamental ways like a mind would do
it. It is a picture of a cosmos structured like a creation. Although details are
disputed, that Christian doctrines of creation and of divine voluntarism
provided a hospitable matrix for science is not in dispute.
As noted above, smooth interlockings of that sort within science are typically taken to have confirmatory force. But surely natural theology could
perfectly properly avail itself of the variant types of legitimate scientific
inference, and should reap some degree of the same epistemic legitimacy
produced by those processes wholly within science. So an epistemic backwash to the philosophical presuppositions of science and on back to the
theological principles which historically provided their foundations and
within which they smoothly embed, would seem both in principle
unproblematic and productive of epistemic significance.
Even deeper potential arises in other ways. First, the possibility of theory-Iadeness of data suggests that currents may sometimes even carry substance as welP If so, then content may migrate among fundamental presupposition, theory, and observational data. Historically, varying conceptions of reality, of the proper aims of science, of the proper conceptual
resources available (or not) to science, of the relative importance of competing epistemic values within science, and so forth have both affected and
been affected by developments within science, within philosophy, and
within theology (not to mention the broader social context in general). Just
as observational data may be theory-laden, theories in this circumstance
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may be metaphysics- or even theology-laden.
Second, it is sometimes argued that conceptual structure and content are
not cleanly separable - that at least in (subtle) part structure is content.
That, if true, has significant implications. As briefly noted above, the early
modem Western European Christian intellectual context provided conceptual resources essential to the very existence and rise of science. That the
(at least implicit) relevance of theological conceptual shapes is not mere historical curiosity is suggested by physicist Paul Davies:
Science began as an outgrowth of theology, and all scientists, whether
atheists or theists ... accept an essentially theological worldview. 4
If Davies is correct (and I think that he is) then science seems to (still)
require a deep theological shape - a theological Cheshire cat's skeleton.
And if structure contributes to content, then here again is subtle natural
theological potential. As one example, I have elsewhere argued that the
logical character typically attributed to natural law - nomological necessity,
lying between logical necessity and accidental generalization yet supporting counterfactuals - is best, or perhaps only, accounted for in terms of
counterfactuals of God's freedom. s
Third, it is widely held that metaphor plays an indispensable role in theoretical understandings. That would carry the potential - indeed the
inevitability - of structure and content flowing into even the most arcane
and abstruse scientific levels. As Dirac once remarked:

Nature's fundamental laws ... control a substratum of which we cannot form a mental picture without introducing irrelevancies"
Fourth, if out of conceptual embedding and interactions any theistic substance flows, at least some whiff of that will nearly inevitably make
its way into science 'proper.' That some theories have particular worldview atmospheres is evident. For instance, least action theories are virtually invisible to anyone outside the inner precincts of physics - almost as if
not quite fit for polite society. Why the obscurity? The reason may have to
do in part with least action's dark past. As one physicist notes,
Maupertuis's
original statement of the principle [of least action] ... was vaguely
theological and could hardly pass muster today.'"
And that theological air lingers. Max Planck noted that
[W]hat we must regard as the greatest wonder of all, is the fact that the
most adequate formulation of this law creates the impression in every
unbiased mind that nature is ruled by a rational, purposive will. 8
Yet, contrary to the standard wisdom on such matters, that deep
theological air does not interfere with genuine scientific scope, power,
effectiveness, elegance, applicability, predictiveness or substance. Planck
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elsewhere observed:
Amid the more or less general laws which mark the achievements of
physical science during the course of the last centuries, the principle
of least action is perhaps that which ... may claim to come nearest to
[the] ideal final aim of theoretical research [i.e., to "condense all natural phenomena which have been observed and are still to be
observed into one simple principle"]9

IV. Rising stakes
(a)

Backwash and pricetags.

That conveyed ethos does not sit comfortably with certain worldviews. We intuitively sense something like what c.s. Lewis once referred
to as a "repugnance of atmospheres" between regnant naturalistic, secular
predispositions and this conveyed impression of a governing "rational,
purposive will." Quite a lot of people (not all of them necessarily anti-religious) are alarmed at the prospect of science lending weight to theism, and
especially at the picture of theological currents running through science
itself. Indeed, according to Harvard biologist Richard Lewontin, that latter
is exactly what the whole structure of 'scientific method' is specifically
designed to protect us all from:
Our willingness to accept claims which are against common sense is
the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and
the supernatural. We take the side of science ... because we have a
prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the
methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a
material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary,
that we are forced by our a priori adherence of material causes to create
an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counterintuitive, no matter how
mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover that materialism is absolute,
for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.lD [emphasis mine]
Thus according to Lewontin and many others, any wisp of a theistic atmosphere is to be rigidly excluded from science 'proper.'
But such exclusion carries a higher potential scientific pricetag than generally realized. Given interconnections, multi-directional content currents,
and so forth, the only way to shield particular parts of science from a backwash from specific results carrying theistic overtones might be to excise
from science itself the factors generating those initial theology-suggestive
specific results. That would of course undercut some prospects for legitimate science-based natural theology. But depending upon what had to be
excised from within science, it might do so by partially impoverishing science itself.
On the opposite end, if the deep theistic foundations underlying science
'leak' into science, then if the only way to stop the leaks is to remove from
science any connection to the offending foundation, then either science

Faith and Philosophy

440

must take essential presuppositions as 'brute', or else science must be
deprived of the relevant foundational resources. In any case, if nature is a
creation, and if that is in fact why science with its essential presuppositions
works, and if the success of science generates a confirmatory backwash
then the demand that science not speak of such matters entails (awkwardly
enough) that science is forbidden to acknowledge some truths which it
itself confirms.
(b) Backwash, demarcation and gatekeepers
Justifying exclusionary prohibitions may be not only more costly,
but also more difficult than usually realized. Any attempt to construct a
conceptual gatekeeper for science would seem to require at least a partial
solution to the old (perhaps intractable) demarcation problem. Beyond
that, the category blurring generated by content migration would dim
prospects for clear demarcation even further. And as my colleague
Stephen Wykstra has argued, (conceptions of) the character, behavior and
status of genuine nature in a theistic, created, and designed universe might
be very different from (conceptions of) the undesigned chance Nature of a
non-theistic, non-created universe. l1 If science is supposed to focus soley
upon the natural, then different conceptions of the natural will affect conceptions of and within science. Conceptions of achievable aims, epistemic
values, plausibility structures, expectations, theoretical resources, evaluative tilts, and normative methodologies as well as anticipated structures,
components, and governance of 'nature' itself might be very different in
theistic and non-theistic universes. So even waiving the usual problems
with demarcation, one might still be unable to formulate defensible demarcation criteria without some sort of de facto assumptions concerning
whether we are in a theistic or non-theistic universe.

v.

Exclusion: methodological naturalism

Whatever the potential costs and difficulties, exclusion is contemporary
orthodoxy and although there are claims that science presupposes philosophical naturalism 12, the exclusionary principle of choice for most is
methodological naturalism, often characterized as follows:
Philosophical naturalism mayor may not be correct (science itself
simply takes no position), but since science cannot deal with the
supernatural, it is an essential methodolOgical principle of science
that science must proceed as if philosophical naturalism is correct. 13
Standard justifications for methodological naturalism can be categorized
as conceptual, pragmatic, or empirical. Conceptual attempts involve either
bare stipulations that science just is methodologically naturalistic (e.g.,
Michael Ruse, Robert Pennock) or appeals to preferred definitions of science (e.g., Eugenie Scott, Nancey Murphy).14 The most compelling pragmatic justification involves the overwhelming attractions of scientific laziness. IS For instance, Pennock:
Once such supernatural explanations are permitted they could be
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used in chemistry and physics as easily as Creationists have used
them in biology and geology. Indeed, all empirical investigation
beyond the purely descriptive could cease, for scientists would have
a ready-made answer for everything. 16
The precise risk is that if it were permissible to countenance design,
supernatural agency, and the like in science, then scientists might abandon
searches too soon, settling for easy - non-natural - alternatives.17And such
easy solutions are scientific dead ends given the standard contention that
references beyond nature are empirically empty. That empirical emptiness
plus the conviction that there is nothing explanatory of any sort left to be
explored or said once investigation reaches the supernatural arena, underlies the common assertion that anything non-natural constitutes a "sciencestopper." And beyond that, it is claimed, scientific progress historically has
flowed exclusively in the wake of recognition of the empirical vacuity of
non-natural theories, and methodological naturalistic prohibitions now
stand solidly justified by their past empirical payoff.
(a)

Some cautions.

None of those justifications is bulletproof. First, it is worth keeping in
mind that definitional attempts are prima facie problematic for the simple
reasons that no one actually has a completely workable definition of science
(nor even necessary and sufficient conditions), and that proposed definitions have been historically unstable. In any case, definitions are human
constructions, and why human definitions should be normative for truth
concerning the objective cosmos is unclear.18
Second, the laziness worry is indeed legitimate, and methodological naturalism as a first approximation pragmatic (but defeasible) strategy may
well be defensible - even crucial. But such pragmatic considerations would
not support inviolable prohibitions. And in any case, there is a corresponding opposing hazard - the risk of refusing to recognize when it is
time to quit. Refusing to abandon the search for a perpetual motion
machine in the belief that scientists had adopted e.g., the second law out of
a lazy reluctance to slog onward with the demanding search for perpetual
motion could have been as prejudicial to science as quitting too soon in
some other areas.
(b) History: pro and can

Furthermore, the history presupposed above is seriously suspect, on
several counts. First, neither science or scientists may be so vulnerable to
the temptations of intellectual sloth as presumed. Indeed, the history of
science would suggest that the risks are not that great on precisely this point.
Historically, no disaster such as that darkly suggested by Pennock
occurred. In fact, if the history of science told by critics of teleology, creationism, intelligent design, and the like is accurate, during the 19th century previously entrenched supernatural design explanations lost the scientific battle to mere fledgling naturalistic explanations - hardly what one
would expect if merely allowing currently disenfranchised supernatural
design explanations into the conversation were likely to destroy current
mature and robust natural science. Thomas Huxley once remarked that:
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Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every new science as
the strangled snakes beside [the cradle] of Hercules. 19
If the infant Hercules could strangle the serpents that surrounded his cradle, it is not terribly likely that the adult Hercules would be done in by
rogue nightcrawlers.
Beyond that, non-natural and teleological approaches within science
have sometimes historical been quite fruitfuPO Furthemore, pursuit of successful strategies in science may not have been the only thing that drove
exclusion of the non-natural. On the contrary, it is evident that e.g. Huxley
and others operated from a prior commitment to naturalism, materialism
and/ or mechanism in their primary work. 21 (And recall Lewontin's statement above.) If key scientific passages were driven by such prior philosophical demands and agendas, the fact (if it is such) that the path of science has led away from the non-natural would have reduced significance.
But still, might not history tell us at least something in this region? For
instance, it might be argued that naturalism has come to characterize science (whatever the reason), and science so characterized has experienced
unrivaled success. Surely, then, this naturalism - whatever its roots enjoys substantial backwash confirmation, removing any lingering need to
appeal to theism. Perhaps. But theism at least holds its own here.
Indeed, key presuppositions required by science and consonant with theism - e.g. of an orderly and intelligible cosmos - seem to be even more scientifically indispensible than are any presuppositions of naturalism. Given
an orderly, intelligible universe, science could still operate whether or not
naturalism of any sort were assumed. There are a number of very simple
existence proofs of that fact: e.g., Newton. Historically, a number of major
scientists took 'natural' laws to be simply manifestations of direct,
moment-to-moment divine activity, and their science did not particularly
suffer from it.;~ But in the absence of this mind-redolent uniformity, intelligibility, and the like, attempts to construct a science even given the
assumption of virtually any type of naturalism will fail.
So if empirical success constitutes empirical confirmation of operative
presuppositions, the fact that a reality which is de facto creation-friendly is
presupposed by science in an even more essential way than is any form of
naturalism, suggests that the success of science tells at least as much in
favor of the deeper, more crucial mind-suggestive presuppositions as it
does any of the structurally more superficial mind-denying naturalistic
presuppositions. 23
Of course, most scientists don't seem to take the success of science as
either payoff or confirmation of theistic presuppositions. But believers and
unbelievers both do feel a theistic tug here. For instance, nature does
sometimes just clobber us with the conviction of designedness - as even
Darwin testified. 24 And Crick's perception of the strength of that impulse is
such to induce him to issue a warning:

Biologists must constantly keep in mind that what they see was not
designed, but rather evolved. 2s
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And again, it is not necessarily irrelevant that it was not until nature
was looked at as a product of design - i.e., as a creation - that science itself
really got off the ground. Blanket stipulative prohibitions (definitional or
otherwise) against exactly that initiating intuition would seem to demand
extraordinary justification.
The related claim - that non-natural theories have no empirical import,
content, or consequences - is not obviously true in any case. On a very
general level, John Leslie says:
Strong evidence for something ... is whatever causes a puzzlement
which the existence of that something would reduce or remove ... 26
In that sense, the existence of other universes, for instance, might explain'
fine-tuning in this one. 27 But by precisely that same principle the empirically determinable fine-tuning of our world would constitute empirical evidence for supernatural design as well. One could, of course, adopt a philosophy which enshrines ultimate puzzlement/8 but its status as philosophy
should not be overlooked.
I

VI. Prohibitions - consequences in principle
The basic problem with pre-stipulated boundaries is that if reality
chooses to ignore our restrictions (and why on earth shouldn't it?), then
theorizing forbidden to cross those boundaries will inevitably be either
incomplete or skewed. 29 That could be particularly problematic were reality an integrated unity - a true cosmos - with theistically-suffused principles
of structure and governance shaping the character of the empirical realm.
In that case, insistence that theorizing about one category of aspects systematically refuse to acknowledge other categories of aspects appears
risky. And that is especially true given the apparent pervasiveness of
backwash effects at all levels, and given the interplay between substantive
matters within science and its embedding conceptual matrix.
Of course, it might be claimed that incompleteness of science is unsurprising - that science does not claim to be complete, that science cheerfully
admits to realms of reality which it does not address. Perhaps - although
that depends upon exactly who is doing the talking. 3D But if science is not
competent to all reality, then the freedom to recognize when to quit pursuing specific programmes becomes imperative.
But even just methodological naturalism conjoined with aspirations for
completeness has substantive implications. First, if one restricts science to
the natural, then assumes that science can in principle get to all truth, then
one has implicitly presupposed philosophical naturalism. 31 But even if one
merely stipulates methodological naturalism as essential to science, then
assumes only that science is competent for all physical matters, or that
what science (properly conducted in the long run) does generate concerning the physical realm will in principle be truth, then if the truth of the specific matter in question is non-natural, even the most excruciatingly proper
naturalistic scientific deliverances on that matter may be wide of the mark,
typically in exactly the way a science built on philosophical naturalism would be. 32
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For practical purposes, that comes close to importing philosophical naturalism into the structure of science.
(a) Further implications
So whether methodological naturalism has substantive philosophical implications depends upon what it operates in tandem with. At the
least, methodological naturalism makes the de facto assumption that there
is an identifiable realm of reality which is in scientifically relevant respects
functionally self-contained and operationally de-coupled from the supernatural. That assumption is neither obvious, trivial, nor - since it is an
empirical universal negative - demonstrable. 33
In any case, if there are relevant but non-natural truths within the structure and governance of the cosmos, a science forbidden the requisite conceptual resources will be unable to accommodate (or acknowledge or
maybe even recognize) those truths. And given that possibility, the widely
accepted 'self-corrective' ability of science will be jeopardized.
(b) Stoppers
One further consideration involves the "science-stopper" concern.
The claim that non-natural theories would point to (or admit of) no further
explorations beyond themselves (e.g., "that's just how God did it" - end of
story) may not be completely true34, but even if it were, it remains to be
shown that that is all bad. It is at least possible that in some areas that
accurately represents the truth of the matter. And a natural science which
is forbidden to stop its natural explaining where the natural explanation
actually stops faces some epistemic difficulties.
A strict methodological naturalism is basically a stipulation that at every
level of explanation the next, more fundamental level of explanation (if
any) must also be sought within the explanatory resources of the natural.
In any area where a genuine, satisfactory explanation can only be found
beyond the natural realm, one's alternatives seem to be (a) abandoning science (at least by that definition) in that area, (b) chOOSing an arbitrary
stopping point, or (c) pursuing a regress of 'natural' and ex hypothesi incorrect explanations through successive levels.
A non-naturalistic theory, on the other hand, might constitute a regressstopper. Naturalism of any sort has no relevant regressing-spiking
resources beyond chance, brute fact, or some sort of necessity - from none
of which conceptual promise just beams. 35 That lack might explain why
doctrinaire naturalists such as Peter Atkins find themselves driven to saying startling things like this:
When we have dealt with the values of the fundamental constants by
seeing that they are unavoidably so, and have dismissed them as
irrelevant, we shall have arrived at complete understanding.
Fundamental science then can rest. 36
(c) Turtles all the way down
Since none of the easily-available naturalistic resources constitute
satisfactory stopping points, naturalism is destined to have no principial
justification for quitting, no matter how appropriate quitting might be. But
unending explanatory sequences (whether infinitely varying, repetitive, or
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regressive) are not logically attractive. Consider the old story about a claim
that the earth rested upon the back of an elephant. When asked what held
up the elephant, the claimant responded that the elephant stood upon the
back of a turtle. When questioned as to what held the turtle up, appeal
was made to another turtle. That turtle, it emerged under further questioning, stood upon the back of yet another turtle. Then faced yet again with
another round of the same question, the claimant exasperatedly shortcut
further (potentially interminable) hounding by declaring that the underpinnings of the earth consisted of "turtles all the way down."
That is widely taken to be obviously - and laughably - explanatorily
fraudulent. And the problem is not reference to turtles - nearly anything all
the way down would constitute the same fraud. The problem is the clearly
suspect assumption that infinite repetitions of the same explanatory
resources whose evident incompleteness on even the first level was what
triggered the sequence of questions could make ultimate explanatory
headway.37
But if "turtles all the way down" is problematic, then "naturalism all the
way down" may be as well. Yet that is precisely the assumption to which
an unending allegiance to methodological naturalism in science apparently
commits one. It is possible to simply bite various bullets and claim that
there really is no ultimate explanation, that brute givens are the final
answer, that reality just is a wildly lucky chance, that basic scientific principles are logically necessary, or that there really are turtles all the way
down. But it is hard to see why anyone should be rationally obliged to do
any of that.

VII. Prohibitions - consequences in practice?
Interesting as the foregoing 'in principle' risks might be, are there any
traces of actual effects of even the most unbending methodological naturalism? There are certainly hints. For instance, with respect to the origin and
diversity of biological life on earth, there are no serious naturalistic candidates beyond evolution. Since methodological naturalism says that naturalistic candidates constitute the entire catalogue of acceptable theories,
evolutionary theory becomes the scientific default position. That is
emphatically not to say that the empirical evidence does not in fact strongly
support evolutionary theory, but it decidedly does mean that the relation
between theory (facing no admissible challengers) and empirical data risks
becoming anomalous. And in fact one does see from a number of prominant evolutionists (e.g., Ruse, Eldridge, and Futuyma) surprisingly explicit
admission of a potential disconnect between actual truth and permissible
biological science (e.g., creationism "is not necessarily wrong ... but it is not
science")38, and closely related assertions from some others (e.g., Pennock,
Dawkins, and Brauer and Brumbaugh)39. However, I shall focus here on a
more current case.

Prohibitions and cosmology
Cosmology offers intriguing examples of methodological (and philosophical) naturalism generating both resistance to some design-friendly ideas and
overly tenacious allegiance to other design-aversive ideas - i.e., both confor-
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mity to prohibitions and resistance to timely quitting. Some of the wellknown initial resistance to Big Bang cosmology (due to its resemblance to
creation-ex-nihilo theologies) might be classified as the former, while the
associated refusal of Hoyle and others to abandon steady-state cosmologies
(pursuing them even to the point where they implied that the majority of the
known universe was anomalous) might fit under the latter heading.
Cosmology is a not-unlikely place for influences not wholly empirical to
emerge. The field is historically relatively new, it strains at the edge of science's observational capabilities, the scope of its theories is huge (cosmic,
even), and given the trickiness and relative scarcity of data and given that
tying sometimes-equivocal data to often-difficult theory is a delicate matter, enormous theoretical edifices often have comparatively tiny empirical
footprints and fairly ethereal scaffolding. Of course, any full-bodied theoretical structure must get its full complement of content somewhere, and
where data are tenuous substance may - sometimes must - be borrowed
from other components of the larger conceptual matrix.
Of present interest is the continuing debate involving fine tuning, cosmological anthropic principles, and many-universe cosmologies. It was for
many centuries believed that life and species resulted from deliberate,
direct design. Darwin proposed an evolutionary mechanism which could
(it was argued) generate (or mimick) apparent exquisite biological design
by blind, natural means - random variation sieved by natural selection
(plus some auxiliary processes). It was noted, however (even by Darwin)4o
that evolution itself depended upon conditions and processes specific
enough to themselves suggest design. Subsequent scientific developments
revealed just how specific the conditions had to be - and how special and
improbable a place the Earth was. Of course, the primary traditional
means of overcoming unfavorable odds is to multiply tries. The apparent
vastness of the cosmos, with its presumed numerous and varied planets
(perhaps 107 in our galaxy alone) seemed to offer ample opportunities for
the cosmos to produce suitable planets purely by chance. However, it
began looking as if the laws, constants, and boundary conditions necessary
just to produce planets within a Big Bang cosmology were themselves subject to wildly tight constraints. By one estimate, the odds of all relevant factors being 'tuned' for the bare production of planets (let alone life) were
one in 1022'1,"1 Such apparent 'fine tuning' got the attention even of those
unsympathetic to non-natural explanations.
There was, of course, a readily available non-natural explanation: that
the basic nomic structures and boundary conditions of the cosmos looked
deliberately designed because they were designed - the laws, conditions,
and parameters even of the Big Bang itself having been delicately adjusted
for subsequent life. Both within and outside science, rational explanation
typically trumps brute fact non-explanations, so the ready availability of a
non-natural explanation for the empirically determinable character of the
cosmos created conceptual pressure for philosophical naturalists.42
The subsequent response is well known. Since, again, the standard
mechanical procedure for overcoming unfavorable odds is to multiply
tries, the available naturalistic recourse was to multiply randomly-varying
universes - indeed, to proliferate them to the degree required to swamp
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odds on the order of one in 1010'23:3 (Some simply postulated infinitely
many worlds, or even all possible worlds. 44 )
Of course, on most tellings, the alternative universes are mutually inaccessible, meaning that from our world their empirical status is tenuous at
best:s Confirming their actual existence seems problematic. Falsifying
their actual existence seems problematic. There must also presumably be
some natural mechanism for generating those worlds. There have been a
number of proposed mechanisms - all of which are, of course, seriously
speculative. Postulation of this thicket of universes more nearly resembles
philosophical hope than empirical science.46
Furthermore it appears that stepping back one level does not solve any
of the really fundamental problems. The production of multiple worlds
intuitively would seem to require a structure of mechanisms, conditions
and capabilities at least as demanding - or fine tuned - as the worlds being
produced. John Leslie, for instance, remarks that:
Even when a Grand Unified Theory is selected cunningly to achieve
the desired results - which ... can look suspiciously like the 'fine tuning' which the inflationary hypothesis is so often praised for rendering unnecessary - you may still be forced to postulate a gigantic space
containing rare regions in which inflation of the right type occurs:7
Others have made similar points (in this and related contexts ):"
Richard Dawkins has (ill-temperedly) remarked that design theories
attempting to explain complexity in terms of a designer of even greater
complexity are "cowardly and dishonest":9 Why the same moral opprobrium should not attach to those trying to explain the fine tuning of our
cosmos in terms of a comparably fine-tuned world-ensemble and worldensemble generator is not clear.")

VIII. Regresses and recursions
In adding infinitely many universes, one may not be getting any ultimate
explanatory traction, and may be importing more - and worse - puzzles
than those with which one began. Of course, similar things could be
alleged concerning theistic theories as well. They add not only an additional level of complexity (a creator / designer), but one which perhaps
imports even more puzzles than does an ensemble of other universes.
But there are intriguing differences. The rough history, recall, is almost
cyclic. Something appears to be a likely product of deliberate design. But
(often for philosophical reasons) a natural, mechanistic, non-design explanation is nonetheless sought. Once accepted, that explanation itself
requires factors and conditions which in their tum seem to be likely candidates for a design explanation. But some deeper-level natural, mechanistic,
non-design explanation is again sought, and when one is accepted it too
exhibits characteristics that invite a design explanation.
It is tempting to suggest that since we never get rid of the initial appearance of the need for design explanations at each level, that that need constitutes an explanatory requirement (turtles) all the way down, indicating
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that the only sort of explanation which can stop the regress is a design
explanation. The response, of course, is that whatever the explanatory
temptation at each level, that natural and mechanical explanations have
ultimately proven adequate at each of those successive levels, and that if
iterations cut any ontological ice, any turtle-dependent case for design is
paralleled by an equally powerful case for naturalism.
That counter cannot be casually dismissed. But there is a difference.
Although the same type of demand arises at each new level, the naturalistic
explanatory resources demanded at each level escalate. The problem facing the naturalist at each level is to overcome unfavorable (typically prohibitive) odds - the odds against earth conditions being just right by
chance, the odds against the boundary conditions of the Big Bang being
just right by chance, the odds against the laws and constants of the cosmos
(or the megaverse) being just right by chance, and so forth. The strategy
again is to multiply tries. But tries must be multiplied at each level. And
getting the right factor f at level L by multiplying tries at that level requires
a broader mechanism than f operating at L -! - a mechanism whose output is
both f and variants upon f. Thus, to get the right sort of planet requires a
mechanism operating at a level more fundamental than the planetary level
- at the planet-producing level - and with the capacity for producing hugely many and varying planets. To get the right sort of universe requires a
mechanism operating at a level more fundamental than the mere universe
level - at the universe-producing level - and with the capacity for producing hugely many and varying universes. Thus, every explanatory retreat
to a production mechanism at a deeper level involves not only escalation of
demands, but a profound broadening of the scope, capacity and powers of
the mechanisms demanded.
But where in the (or any) world does one go for a broader mechanism
than that which produces not only multiple universes, but perhaps infinitely many universes?5! The situation resembles not only a regress, but a
rapidly degenerating regress at that - a classic Kuhnian case of the growth
of explanatory demands and complexities outstripping increases in
explanatory payoffs.
If that is the case, then unless arbitrarily halted at some level, doctrinaire
conformity to methodological naturalism will guarantee that cosmology is
driven into sterility. Without some sort of stopper - a cosmological telomere - science simply frays away. (The earlier Atkins quote represents an
attempt to finesse the problem, but I know of no empirical support for that
hopeful proposal.) By contrast at each successive level L, precisely the same
design resources - e.g., a supernatural being - which would have been adequate at the lower level will be adequate at Las well. 52

VIII. Natural theology again
Methodological naturalism may, again, be strategically important.
But it not only fails to be a universal trump card but depending upon how
inflexibly it is wielded has the potential for scientific disfunction. Prospects
for the varieties of natural theology suggested earlier are thus so far forth
still live. Indeed, a few suggestive points can now emerge.
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First, it is at the least intriguing that fine-tuning - with its suggestion of intentionality - has arisen out of a scientific context specifically constructed (on Lewontin's telling) to preclude exactly such suggestions.
Maybe the cosmos is positively insisting on telling us something whether
we propose to hear it or not. Not only did the suggestion emerge unbidden, but bringing it to heel has proven particularly problematic and costly.
Throughout most scientific history, simplicity, elegance and other allied
considerations played substantive roles in theory construction and evaluation. One standard element in such legitimately scientific considerations
was 'Ockham's Razor'. Yet, the impulse to avoid design conceptions (and
associated natural theology possibilities) at the cost of huge rafts of universes looks like abandonment of that principle. 53 Paul Davies, for
instance, remarks that
Invoking an infinite number of other universes just to explain the
apparent contrivances of the one we see is pretty drastic, and in stark
conflict with Occam's razor. 54
In the case of infinitely many universes, Ockham would be well advised to
bring along more than a mere razor - perhaps something more like a chainsaw.
Furthermore, the dynamic and structure of the escape attempts are suggestive as well. That the successive layers of proposed naturalistic cosmological explanations differ at each explanatory level but never discharge the
mystery of the recurring fine-tuning may constitute an explanatory regress,
while the same possible design explanation being conceptually adequate at
each level might suggest that the parallel design track exhibits an explanatory recursion, whose stable character really does indicate an ultimate,
foundational fact of reality. There is potentially a difference here which
might indicate a foundational priority of design over ultimate brute
mechanical naturalism. Just as repetition of pattern at each successive scale
in a Mandlebrot picture reveals a fundamental and stable scale-invariant
structure in the equations producing it, it may be that a repetition of
design-suggestive and design-explainable pattern at successive levels in
cosmological explanations reveals a fundamental structure at the core of
the cosmos. In short, if design-suggestive structures reappear at each new
level of analysis, and if (as argued earlier) design-related matters are conceptually more fundamental than naturalism it may be that the turtles not
only do not go all the way down, but that even whatever turtles there are
are in fact designed.
And finally, there is one broader matter. As noted earlier, doctrinaire
stipulation of naturalism (methodological or otherwise) risks skewing even
purely empirical results in some areas of scientific investigation. That seems
to be especially plausible in worlds that are created. But there is a further
risk. It has recently been argued that the only plausible justification for various science-essential presuppositions is that our perceptual, conceptual, and
other cognitive systems were deliberately designed for catching onto specific
types of truth. But if an omnipotent supernatural being deliberately constructed both our cognitive structures and the natural world we investigate
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via those structures, it is clearly possible that we and the world were coordinately fashioned in such a way that features of nature as comprehended by
our epistemic faculties would reveal to us specified features of the maker of
both. Suppose that not only was the creation intended to speak to us concerning its creator, but that creation's voice was multileveled - some things
being audible only through particular results discoverable only scientifically.
Processes which either skew or truncate the picture of nature science generates could obscure the very features of nature in question, obscuring in turn
what nature was meant at that point to say. Unbending application of even
methodological naturalism might thus preferentially position science precisely to miss natural-theology-relevant deep features of nature, and might
consequently force us to miss their theological import.

IX. Conclusion
Both scientific progress and deeper philosophical understanding of
science reveal richer prospects for a science-rooted natural theology than
standard cultural myth would have it.
And the obstacle of choice methodological naturalism - although perhaps indispensible as a provisional pragmatic scientific strategy is dubious as a norm. To wield it as
a theistic (or design, or natural theology) conversation-stopper around
science leaps well beyond any justification it can muster, any track
record it can cite, and any future promise it can seriously make. Indeed,
a doctrinaire prohibition on what one is permitted qua scientist to think,
may ultimately not only work to the detriment of empirical science, but
may obscure or contort deeper theological messages nature may carry.
Although he undoubtedly did not mean it as I shall use it, Nobel physiologist Christian DeDuve recently remarked:
We need a pathway, a succession of chemical steps leading from the
first building blocks of life to the RNA world. Chemistry, however,
has so far failed to elucidate this pathway. At first sight, the kind of
chemistry needed seems so unlikely to take place spontaneously that
one might be tempted to invoke, as many have done and some still
do, the intervention of some supernatural agency. Scientists, however, are condemned by their calling to look for natural explanations of
even the most unnatural-looking events.55 [my emphasis]
Perhaps in these politically correct and postmodern times we should
free the scientists.56
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